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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK ALDON HEWITT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
THE GENERAL TIRE AND RUB-
BER COMPANY, a corporation, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case, at the conclusion of the presentation 
of evidence, the respondent made a motion for a directed 
verdict which motion the court took under advisement 
pending the verdict of the jury. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the appellant on April 23, 1953 (R. 3). 
On the same date the clerk signed and entered the judg-
ment on the verdict (R. 4). Thereafter the respondent 
renewed its motion for directed verdict and in the alter-
native for a new trial (R. 5-6). The court granted the 
motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment not-
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withstanding the verdict in favor of the respondent, no 
cause of action (R. 8-9). From this judgment the appel-
lant appealed and this court on May 24, 1955, filed its 
decision reversing the trial court and ordering that the 
judgment upon the jury verdict be reinstated (R. 11-15). 
Upon denial of the petition for rehearing the remittitur 
was issued December 2, 1955 (R. 10). The respondent 
made a motion to deny interest and retax costs which 
was heard on January 25, 1956, and the District Court 
made and entered an order disallowing the appellant's 
interest from the date of the judgment on the verdict 
to the date of the order entered by the Supreme Court 
denying the petition for rehearing (R. 18, 23). From 
this order appellant has filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINT UPON WHICH 
APPELLANT RELIES 
The appellant is entitled to interest on the verdict 
and the judgment from April 23, 1953, until paid. 
ARGUMENT 
Section 15-1-4, Utah Code .Annotated, 1953, provides 
that the judgment obtained in this case shall bear interest 
at the rate of 8% per annum. Rule 54 (e) provides as 
follows: 
"(e) lutcrcst and Costs to be Included in the 
.! nd_qmcut. The clerk must include in any judg-
ment signed by him any interest on the verdict 
or decision from the time it was rendered, and 
the costs, if the same haYe been taxed or ascer-
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tained. The clerk must, within two days after 
the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any 
case where not included in the judgment, insert 
the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment 
for that purpose, and make a similar notation 
thereof in the Register of Actions and in the 
Judgment Docket.'' 
It is the view of the Appellant that Rule 54 (e) is 
decisive of the question now before this Court, as it 
requires the Clerk to include in the judgment signed 
by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the 
date it was rendered. Both the verdict and the judgment 
on the verdict were entered on April 23, 1953. It has 
been similarly decided in California, which has a statute 
substantially identical to ours. Section 1035, California 
Code of Civil Procedure, provides as follows: 
''The Clerk must include in the judgment 
entered up by him any interest on the verdict or 
decision of the court from the date it was rendered 
or made, and the costs, if the same have been 
taxed or ascertained; and he must, within two 
days after the same are taxed or ascertained, if 
not included in the judgment, insert the same in 
a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and 
must make a similar insertion of the costs in the 
copies and docket of the judgment.'' 
The above section was re-enacted in 1933 as part 
of Section 1033 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 
We desire to refer the court to the case of Bond rs. 
United States Railroad of Sam Francisco ( 1911) (Calif.) 
113 P. 2d 366. In that case the jury returned a general 
verdict in the amount of $4,500.00 and the jury also made 
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answer to certain particular questions of fact. On the 
basis of those answers, the defendant moved the court 
to return a judgment to the plaintiff for $405.00 and no 
more, which motion the trial court granted. The plain-
tiff appealed, and the Appellant Court ordered that the 
court below enter judgment for the plaintiff in the 
amount of the general verdict of $4,500.00. In applying 
the above-mentioned California statute, the court held 
as follows (at page 373): 
''The appellant asks the court to modify the 
judgment heretofore given by adding a direction 
that in giving the judgment in the court below 
the accrued interest on the verdict shall be in-
cluded. Our consideration of the verdict and 
judgment was entirely in relation to the state of 
the case at the time the judgment appealed from 
was given in the court below. It was with refer-
ence to that period that w-e directed the entry of 
judgment by that court for the sum of $4,500 
upon the going down of the remittitur. There was 
no intention to restrict the power of the court 
below, or of its clerk, to perform the ministerial 
duty of computing the interest which has accrued 
between the date of the return of the verdict and 
the entry of the judgment and including it in the 
judgment finally entered, as provided by section 
1035 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court 
below will lw at liberty to perform that duty, or 
f'P(' that its clerk does so. notwithstanding the 
l:mg-nage of the mandate of the decision herein-
before g-iYen by this court.'' 
See also (;olden Oatc 1lfill and Jliuiug Company vs. 
Joshua H c }/(IN Jl achine n:r orks (Calif.) ~3 P. 45; Degnan 
'Us. roun_q Bndhcrs' Cattle Co. (I(an.) 103 P. 2d 918; 
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Glen vs. Rice (Calif.) 162 P. 1020. In the latter case, the 
court held that interest ran from the original date of 
the judgment upon modification of the judgment by the 
appellant court. See also Zeidler vs. Goelzer (Wis.) 211 
N.W. 140. In that case, under a statute which directs 
that interest from the date of the verdict shall be com-
puted by the clerk and added to the costs of the party 
entitled thereto, it was held that interest should run from 
the date of the verdict on the original trial even though 
an intervening new trial was ordered on appeal for the 
determination of a single issue. 
We also desire to refer the court to the case of 
Stever vs. Associated Transport, Inc., 63 N.Y.S. 2d 606, 
affirmed in 70 N. E. 2d 169. In that case the jury ren-
dered a verdict in the amount of $40,000.00. A motion 
for new trial was made on all the statutory grounds. 
The court granted the motion on the ground of excessive-
ness of damages but stipulated for denial of the motion 
in the event plaintiff would accept a lesser amount of 
$22,500.00. The plaintiff failed to accept the reduction 
and appealed. On appeal the order granting the new 
trial was affirmed with leave given to the plaintiff to 
accept the reduced amount. The plaintiff accepted, and 
included in the amount of the judgment was $1185.00, 
interest from the date that the verdict was entered to 
the date of judgment. It \vas held that plaintiff was 
entitled to interest from the date of the verdict. 
The case of J.Y! etcalf vs. City of W atertoum, C.C.A. 
7th, 68 F. 859, was a suit upon a judgment. In that 
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case the trial court made a finding to the effect that a 
judgment had been rendered in the sum averred in the 
complaint but gave judgment to the defendant on the 
ground that the statute of limitation barred recovery. 
Thereafter, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
order and directed the trial court to enter judgment for 
the plaintiff on the finding. Afterwards, at the same 
term of court, the trial court disallowed interest from 
the date of the original finding and the entry of the 
judgment from which the plaintiff appealed. The court 
said at page 864: 
''The judgment of the Circuit Court is re-
versed with costs, and the cause remanded with 
direction that the appellant be given judgment 
for the amount due upon the finding of August 
2, 1889, including interest to that date, with 
interest thereon to the date of judgment hereby 
ordered ... '' 
There is a statute in Wisconsin which provides that 
the clerk shall add interest from the date of the verdict 
or report. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit has adopted, and in several cases reaffirmed, 
the rule which we seek this court to apply here. The 
leading case is Louisiana aud Arkansas Railway Com-
pany rs. Pratt, C.C.A. 5th, 142 F. 2d 847. In that case 
the plaintiff brought a suit under the F.E.L.A. and 
obtained a verdict for $5,000.00, but the trial court 
entered judgment non obstante veredicto for the defend-
ant. On appeal the judgment was reversed and the cause 
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remanded with instructions that judgment be entered 
upon the verdict. The judgment entered pursuant to the 
mandate allowed interest from the date of ''judicial 
demand", applying the Louisiana statute. The defend-
ant appealed on the interest point only. We quote from 
the decision, commencing at page 853 : 
''In all actions for personal injuries brought 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the 
remedy given by that statute is exclusive, and all 
state laws are superseded in so far as they 
attempt to cover the same field. At the time the 
Act was enacted, interest was not allowable on 
claims for personal injuries until the amount of 
damages had been judicially ascertained. This 
was upon the theory that no debt was due prior 
thereto or that interest was a part of the dam-
ages and was merged therewith in the amount 
awarded ... " 
''The determination that interest was not 
properly allowable from the date of judicial 
demand gives rise to the inquiry as to the date 
from which it should begin to run. The only ap-
plicable federal statute, Section 966 of the Revised 
Statutes, provides that interest shall be allowed 
from date thereof on all judgments in civil causes 
recovered in a district court. Under this statute, 
as appellant admits, appellee was entitled to 
interest at least from the date of entry of judg-
ment on the mandate. It has been held to be 
within the equity of Section 966 of the Revised 
Statutes to award interest from the date of the 
verdict where, without fault of the plaintiff, an 
appreciable time has elapsed between the rendi-
tion of the verdict and the entry of the judgment. 
Moreover, Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, 
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provides that, unless the court otherwise directs, 
judgment upon the verdict of a jury shall be 
entered forthwith by the clerk. Under said rule, 
the date of the verdict and the date when the 
judgment should have been entered are the same 
in this case. For these reasons, we conclude that 
plaintiff below was entitled to interest from the 
date judgment should have been entered as re-
quired by said Rule 58. Such award is within the 
equity of the federal interest statute on judg-
ments, and is not inconsistent with the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. (Italics ours) 
''The judgment appealed from is reversed, 
and the cause remanded to the district court with 
instructions to enter judgment for the amount 
awarded by the jury with interest thereon from 
the date of the verdict. '' 
Another Fifth Circuit case is that of Gi rens vs. 
Missouri-Kansas-Te.ras R. Co. of Texas, 196 F. 2d 905. 
For the convenience of the court, we set forth the deci-
sion in its entirety. 
'' Bv the mandate of this court issued April 
23rd, i952, the judgment of the district court 
overruling the plaintiff's motion for judgment in 
the amount of $12,000.00 was reversed with in-
structions to enter such a judgment on the verdict 
of the jury. The appellant, plaintiff below, now 
InoYt'~ the court to amend its mandate so as to 
dirert that the judgment to be entered by the 
district court provide for interest at the rate of 
six per cpnt (tic;,) per annum from the lth day 
of December, l~);)l\ the date the plaintiff below 
filed his n1otion for judgment on the verdict of 
thP jury. In so moving to amend this court's 
mnud:ltt', the appellant is following the proper 
pro<·t>dnn' a~ approved hy the Supreme Court in 
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Briggs v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 334 U. S. 
304, 306, 68 S. Ct. 1039, 92 L. Ed. 1403. In the 
same case the Second Circuit had also indicated 
that this was the appropriate procedure. 164 F. 
2d 21, 23, 1 A.L.R. 2d 475. 
"In that case the Supreme Court had granted 
certiorari to resolve a conflict between the deci-
sion of the Second Circuit and a decision of this 
circuit in Louisiana & Arkansas R. Co. v. Pratt, 
142 F. 2d 847, 153 A.L.R. 851. In the Second 
Circuit case no motion to amend the mandate had 
been made during the term at which it was entered 
and both the Second Circuit and the Supreme 
Court on certiorari pretermitted a decision of 
the question of whether on proper application 
interest should be allowed from the day on which 
the plaintiff was originally entitled to judgment 
in the district court. 
"It is provided in mandatory terms by 28 
U.S.C.A. 1961 that 'Interest shall be allowed on 
any money judgment in a civil case recovered in 
a district court.' That section further provides 
that 'Such interest shall be calculated from the 
date of the entry of the judgment, at the rate 
allowed by State law.' The law of Texas as set 
out in Article 5072, Revised Civil Statutes of 
Texas, provides that interest on judgments shall 
be at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum. 
Rule 58, F.R.C.P., 28 U.S.C.A., provides that 
judgment upon the verdict of the jury shall be 
entered forthwith by the clerk unless the court 
otherwise directs. 
''The verdict of the jury was in response to 
forty special issues and was rendered on Decem-
ber 4th, 1950. On December 7th, 1950 both the 
plaintiff and the defendant moved for judgment 
on the jury's verdict. It was not until February 
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13th, 1951 that the district court decided these 
motions and entered judgment for the defendant. 
In Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 164 F. 2d 21, 
22, Judge Chase speaking for that circuit said: 
'Since no judgment could have been en-
tered until the motion pending after verdict 
had been decided by the trial court, no interest 
can be allowed between the date of the verdict 
and May 28, 1945 when that motion was de-
cided and the judgment for the defendant was 
erroneously entered.' 
"We think that our decision in Louisiana & 
Arkansas R. Co. v. Pratt, supra, was in all respects 
sound. Accordingly it is ordered and adjudged 
that the mandate of this court heretofore issued 
on the 23rd day of April, 1952 be recalled and that 
an amended mandate be issued to provide that the 
judgment in the amount of $12,000.00 to be entered 
by the district court shall provide also for interest 
on that amount from the 13th day of February, 
1951. To that extent the motion to amend the 
mandate is granted.'· 
In Coyle Liufs, Inc. rs. [~nited States, C.C.A. 5th, 
198 F. 2d 195, the court again re-affirmed the principal 
which \H' de~irl' this court to apply in the case at bar. 
Tl1at ens(_' \Yns a suit in admiralty. ~\.t the trial, the court 
found the libelant had been damaged in the sum of 
$21,661.:~.> hut also found mutual fault on the part of 
hoth 1 >:trt il·~. and, therefore, gave judgment to the 
libelant. in t ht> amount of $10,830.67. In the first appeal 
from this judgnw11t reported in 195 F. :2d l~ll. the Fifth 
Cir<'nit Court found that the rnited States was solely 
at f:llllt. :llld rt>\.t'l'~l'd the judgment of the trial court 
10 
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directing that the libelant be awarded the full amount 
of its damages with interest and costs. The case came 
up to the Circuit Court again on the interest question 
and was reported in 198 F. 2d 195. In that case, the court 
ruled that interest should be allowed from the date 
libelant was originally entitled to judgment. The applic-
able federal law referred to in the opinion allowed in-
terest at the rate of 4% per annum against the Govern-
ment upon the money judgment. The court said at page 
196: 
"The interest on the damages should be cal-
culated at the rate of 4% per annum until satis-
fied and should run from April 25, 1951, the date 
on which the libelant was originally entitled to 
judgment in the district court.'' 
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit Court re-asserted 
the rule in the case of Wright vs. Paramount-Richards 
Theatres, Inc., et al., C.C.A. 5th, 198 F. 2d 303. The jury 
in that case returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the 
amount of $16,000.00. Subsequently, the motion for the 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted, and 
the judgment entered for the defendants. The court 
reversed the trial court judgment, saying (at page 308): 
''The cause is reversed with instructions to 
enter judgment on the verdict of the jury in 
favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $16,000.00 
with interest from the date on which said judg-
ment should have been entered, April 23, 1951. 
See opinion on motion to amend mandate, May 
27, 1952, in Givens vs. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. 
Co., 5th Cir., 196 F. 2d 905." 
11 
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Finally, in the case of Y arno vs. Hedlund Box and 
Lumber Co. (Calif.) 237 P. 1002, the jury gave a verdict 
for $22,310 on breach of contract. On appeal the court 
ruled that the judgment should be reversed and the 
cause remanded with instructions to ascertain the worth 
of the recovery at the time of the return of the verdict 
in accordance with directions given in the opinion. The 
trial court was ordered to enter a judgment for the re-
duced amount. Thereafter, the trial court found the 
worth of the recovery at the time of the return of the 
verdict was $19,065.69 and allowed interest thereon in 
the amount of $1445.69 from the original date of the 
judgment. The defendant appealed from that portion of 
the judgment which allowed interest, and the judgment 
was affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time the verdict was handed down by the 
jury and the judgment on the verdict was entered in this 
case, the amount of plaintiff's damages became liqui-
dated and 'vere definite of ascertainment, and the plain-
tiff under the statutes of this state is entitled to interest 
upon that liquidated claim during the period in which 
he was pn'YC'll1Pd from having the use of the money. 
The plaintiff would not receive full justice under the 
law upon rP i m·d a 1Pnwll1 of the verdict unless such interest 
is allowed. \ V P rc~1wdfully conclude that the order of 
the <lir-;trid court should be reversed; that the cause 
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions 
12 
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to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for interest 
or the judgment on the verdict from April 23, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODROW D. WHITE 
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